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1 Introduction
The stable marriage problem [3,5] is a classical bipartite matching problem.
In its original setting, an instance consists of n men, n women, and each
person's preference list, where a preference list is a totally ordered list of all
the members of the opposite sex according to his/her preference. A matching
is a set of disjoint pairs each consisting of a man and a woman. For a matching
M , a pair of a man m and a woman w is called a blocking pair if both prefer
each other to their current partners. A matching with no blocking pair is
called stable. Gale and Shapley [3] showed that every instance admits at least
one stable matching, and proposed an O(n2)-time algorithm, known as the
Gale-Shapley algorithm, to nd one.
There are several examples of using the stable marriage problem in assign-
ment systems, including residents/hospitals matching [5,19], students/schools
matching [1,2,22], etc. Clearly, the restrictions that each preference list must
be strict (i.e., it is a totally ordered list) and complete (i.e., it includes all the
members of the opposite side) are unrealistic for such applications. Two natu-
ral relaxations are then to allow for ties and incompleteness. (There are three
denitions of stability when ties are allowed [5,8]. In this paper, we consider
weak stability, which is the most natural notion among the three.) Applying
either one or both of these extensions does not aect the validity of the prop-
erties that a stable matching exists for any instance and that one can be found
in polynomial time. Hence a stable matching can be found eciently even with
these extensions.
However, if one is concerned with the size of stable matchings, the situation
changes signicantly. In the original setting and an extension with only ties,
a stable matching is a perfect matching by denition. In an extension with
only incomplete preference lists, a stable matching may no longer be perfect
but for a xed instance, all of the stable matchings have the same size due
to the famous Rural Hospitals Theorem [4]. Thus the problem of nding a
largest stable matching is solvable in polynomial time for all of these cases. In
contrast, if we allow both extensions, one instance can have stable matchings
of dierent sizes, and hence the problem of nding a largest stable matching
(which we call hereafter MAX SMTI (MAXimum Stable Marriage with Ties
and Incomplete lists)) is no longer trivial. In fact, this problem was shown to
be NP-hard [11,17]. Since a stable matching is a maximal matching, any two
stable matchings dier in size by at most a factor of two. Hence, constructing
a polynomial-time 2-approximation algorithm is easy.
There has been a sequence of improvements of the 2-approximation ratio.
The rst attempt was made by using a local search type algorithm, which
successively increases the size of a stable matching at each iteration [12,13],
but these upper bounds approach 2 as n goes to innity. The rst upper
bound strictly better than 2 was obtained along this line. Iwama et al. [14] ob-
tained an upper bound of 1.875 by modifying the aforementioned local search.
Later, Kiraly [15] improved it to 5/3 by using a completely dierent idea.
His algorithm is a modication of the Gale-Shapley algorithm so that each
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man may propose to the same woman more than once, and the roles of men
and women are exchanged during the execution. McDermid [18] improved
Kiraly's algorithm by exploiting a classical result in graph theory, the Gallai-
Edmonds decomposition, and obtained an upper bound of 1.5, which is the
current best approximation ratio. Meanwhile, the best-known lower bound is
33=29 (> 1:1379) under the assumption that P6=NP [23].
For a given instance, let Mopt be a largest stable matching and M be any
stable matching. Consider a union of Mopt and M , which can be seen as a
bipartite graph. Each connected component is an alternating path or cycle. If
every connected component is a path of length three that contains two Mopt-
edges and one M -edge, then jMoptj = 2jM j, which is the worst possible case
mentioned above. All of the above approximation algorithms were designed to
exclude as many such length-three paths as possible. The ratio of 1.875 [14]
was achieved by excluding a constant fraction (relative to the size of M) of
such components. And in [15], beyond his 5/3 result, Kiraly was also able to
remove all such length-three paths (which led to the approximation ratio of
1.5) if the instance has ties on only one side, which is another main result
of that paper. As an extension, McDermid [18] nally succeeded in excluding
them completely for general instances.
A natural extension of this line of research is to attack augmenting paths
of length ve. In order to break the bound of 1.5, we need to remove those
paths at least by a constant fraction. This is apparently a challenging goal for
general instances. Even if ties are on only one side, Kiraly stated in Conjecture
3 in [15] that breaking the 1.5-approximation implies something \surprising,"
that is, breaking the 1.5-approximation upper bound of MAX SMTI with one-
sided ties implies breaking the 3-approximation upper bound of the minimum
vertex cover problem in 3-uniform hyper-graphs (which disproves the Unique
Games Conjecture (UGC) [16]).
Our Contributions. In this paper, we improve the approximation ratio
from 1.5 to 25=17 (< 1:4706) for instances with one-sided ties, which disproves
Kiraly's conjecture under UGC. We note that this approximation ratio also
holds for the hospitals/residents problem (i.e., many-one variant) with one-
sided ties (see [9] for the relationship between approximability of the stable
marriage problem and the hospitals/residents problem).
The basic idea is to use an integer program (IP) and its linear program
(LP) relaxation, which is summarized as follows: note that the Gale-Shapley
algorithm (GS) consists of a sequence of proposals from men to women (see
[5] for details). Kiraly's algorithm, GSA1, is similar to GS, but is dierent in
that each man goes through his list twice for proposals. In GSA1, each man
has one of two possible states, \unpromoted" or \promoted" (these terms are
taken from McDermid's paper [18]). Each man is initially unpromoted, and
once he has proposed to all of the women on his list, he becomes promoted
and starts again by making proposals from the top of the list. When a woman
receives proposals from two men with the same preference but dierent states,
she always selects the promoted one. It should be more powerful to use not
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only two dierent states, unpromoted and promoted, but more quantitative
information for the same purpose. Our new idea is to formulate MAX SMTI
as an IP by generalizing the IP formulation for the original stable marriage
problem [20,21], and then to solve its LP relaxation (in polynomial time). We
use this optimal solution to dene the state of each man.
Finally, we briey discuss the limits of our approach using the integrality
gap of our IP formulation.
Related Results. As mentioned above, general MAX SMTI is approximable
within 1.5, but cannot be approximated with a ratio smaller than 33=29 (>
1:1379) unless P=NP and smaller than 4=3 (> 1:3333) under UGC [23]. If the
length of each man's list is bounded by 2, it is solvable in polynomial time even
if women's lists are of arbitrary length, while it is NP-hard even if the length
of each preference list is bounded by 3 [10]. The only known approximability
result with a ratio smaller than 1.5 is a randomized approximation algorithm
that achieves an expected approximation ratio of 10=7 (< 1:4286) for the
special case that ties appear on one side only and the length of each tie is at
most two [6].
The restriction for MAX SMTI that ties appear in preference lists of one sex
only is quite natural in practice. For example, it is reported that in the Scottish
Foundation Allocation Scheme (SFAS), a hospitals/residents matching system
in Scotland, residents are required to submit strictly ordered preference lists
while each hospital's list may contain one tie [9]. Even under this restriction,
MAX SMTI remains NP-hard and is not approximable with a ratio smaller
than 21=19 (> 1:1052) unless P=NP, and smaller than 5=4 under UGC [7]. In
this restricted setting, Irving and Manlove [9] presented a 5/3-approximation
algorithm. Kiraly [15] improved it to 1.5, which is the previous best upper
bound as well as the McDermid bound [18] for the general case.
2 Preliminaries
An instance I of MAX SMTI comprises n men, n women and each person's
preference list that may be incomplete and may include ties. If a person p
includes a person q (of the opposite sex) in p's preference list, we say that q is
acceptable to p. Without loss of generality, we assume that m is acceptable to
w if and only if w is acceptable to m. A matching M is a set of pairs (m;w)
such that m is acceptable to w and vice versa, and each person appears at
most once in M . If (m;w) 2 M , we say that m (w) is matched in M , and
write M(m) = w and M(w) = m. If a person p does not appear in M , we say
that p is single in M .
If m strictly prefers wi to wj , we write wi m wj . If wi and wj are tied in
m's list (including the case that wi = wj), we write wi =m wj . The statement
wi m wj is true if and only if wi m wj or wi =m wj . We use similar
notations for women's preference lists. We say that m and w form a blocking
pair for a matching M (or simply, (m;w) blocks M) if the following three
conditions are met: (i) M(m) 6= w but m and w are acceptable to each other,
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(ii) w m M(m) or m is single in M , and (iii) m w M(w) or w is single in
M . A matching M is called stable if there is no blocking pair for M . MAX
SMTI is the problem of nding a largest stable matching.
The approximation ratio of an approximation algorithm T is maxfopt(I)=
T (I)g over all instances I, where opt(I) and T (I) are the sizes of the optimal
and the algorithm's solutions, respectively.
The following IP formulation of MAX SMTI instance I, denoted by IP (I),
is a generalization of the one for the original stable marriage problem given in










xi;w  1 8w (1)X
j





xi;w   xm;w  1 8(m;w) 2 A (3)
xm;w = 0 8(m;w) 62 A (4)
xm;w 2 f0; 1g 8(m;w) (5)
Here, A is the set of mutually acceptable pairs, that is, (m;w) 2 A if and only
if each of m and w includes the other in the preference list. In this formulation,
\xm;w = 1" is interpreted as \m and w are matched," and \xm;w = 0" other-
wise. Thus the objective function is equal to the size of a matching. Note that
Constraint (3) ensures that (m;w) is not a blocking pair. When xm;w = 1, all
three terms of the lefthand side are 1 and hence Constraint (3) is satised.
When xm;w = 0, either the rst or the second term of the lefthand side must
be 1, which implies that m (respectively w) must be matched with a partner
as good as w (respectively m). LP (I) denotes the linear program relaxation
of IP (I) in which Constraint (5) is replaced by \0  xm;w  1."
3 Approximation Algorithm
In the following, we assume that the men's lists are strict and the women's
lists may contain ties. Algorithm 1 gives the pseudo-code for our algorithm
GSA-LP. We use a variable f(m), which assigns a non-negative value to each
manm. The value of f(m) is initially set to zero but increases as the algorithm
proceeds. We also use another variable p(m), which stores the current position
for m in his preference list. When man m proposes to woman w, w accepts this
proposal if either (a) w is single in M , (b) m w M(w), or (c) m =w M(w)
and f(m) > f(M(w)). Otherwise, w rejects m's proposal. When w accepts
m's proposal, we let M := M [ f(m;w)g for Case (a), and let M := M [
f(m;w)g n f(M(w); w)g for Cases (b) and (c).
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Algorithm 1 GSA-LP (Gale-Shapley Algorithm with LP solution)
Input: An SMTI instance I
Output: A matching M
1: Formulate the given instance I as an integer program IP (I)
2: Solve its LP relaxation LP (I) and obtain an optimal solution x(= fxi;jg)
3: Let M := ;
4: Set f(m) := 0 and p(m) := 1 for each man m
5: while there exists a man m such that (m is single in M) and (f(m)  3) do
6: Let m be an arbitrary such man
7: if p(m) is larger than the length of m's preference list then
8: if f(m)  1 then
9: Set f(m) := 2 and p(m) := 1
10: else
11: Set f(m) := f(m) + 1 and p(m) := 1
12: end if
13: else
14: Let w be the p(m)-th woman of m's preference list
15: if m has not proposed to w yet then
16: Set f(m) := f(m) + xm;w
17: Let m propose to w
18: Set p(m) := 1
19: else
20: Let m propose to w





Here is an intuition of our new algorithm GSA-LP: It basically consists of
three rounds of proposal sequences by each man m with the rank-adjusting
value f(m). In the rst round, f(m) is increased by xm;w whenever m sends
a proposal to w for the rst time (Lines 15{18). The key thing here is that
if m is rejected by this new woman w (either immediately or later after once
accepted), then he restarts his sequence of proposals from the top of his list
(Line 18). Note that in the restarted sequence of proposals, women he proposes
to are not new until w. Up to that woman, f(m) does not change and the
restart does not happen.
If m has proposed to all of the women in his list and he is still single, then
the value of f(m) is set to 2 (Lines 8{9) and m goes to the second round. In
the second round, the value of f(m) does not change and m sends a sequence
of proposals from top of his list again. If m is still single after nishing this
sequence, then f(m) is increased by 1 (namely, f(m) is set to 3) (Lines 10{11)
and m restarts another sequence of proposals again (the third round). If m
is still single after the third round, f(m) is set to 4 and hereafter m sends
no more proposals. Note that not every man goes into the third round, but if
a man enters the third round, then it is guaranteed that his second round is
completed.
Note that just before m rst proposes to w in his rst round, he has
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but was rejected by all of them. Also, when a man m proposes to the woman
at the tail of his list for the rst time, f(m)  1. Finally, note that if m is
single in M at the termination of GSA-LP, he has proposed to all the women
in his list with the value f(m) = 3, and f(m) = 4 holds at the termination of
GSA-LP.
It is not hard to see that GSA-LP runs in polynomial time. For the correct-
ness, let M be a matching obtained by GSA-LP, and let (m;w) 2 A nM . If m
has not proposed to w, then M(m) m w and hence (m;w) is not a blocking
pair. If m has proposed to w, then m was rejected by w at some time, and at
this moment w must have been matched with a man m0 such that m0 w m.
Since hereafter w never accepts a proposal from a man inferior to m0, it must
be the case that M(w) w m0 w m. Hence (m;w) is not a blocking pair, so
that M is stable.
The following instance I1, presented in [15], is a worst-case instance for
both the Kiraly [15] and the McDermid [18] algorithms.
m1: w1 w1: m2 m1
m2: w2 w1 w2: (m2 m3)
m3: w2 w3 w3: m3
Here, when two or more men are in the same parenthesis in a woman w's
preference list, it means that they are tied in w's list. In the current exam-
ple, m2 and m3 are tied in w2's list. The optimal solution of I1 is Mopt =
f(m1; w1); (m2; w2); (m3; w3)g, but these two algorithms may output a stable
matchingM = f(m2; w1); (m3; w2)g. During the execution of these algorithms,
w2 receives proposals from both m2 and m3. To obtainMopt, we want to make
w2 choose m2 rather than m3, so that m3 proposes to w3. But in these algo-
rithms, there are executions in which w2 chooses m3 (depending on the order
of the proposals).
In contrast, our algorithm GSA-LP always obtains the optimal solution.
The LP relaxation LP (I1) has the following (unique) optimal solution x
.
 xmi;wj = 1 for i = j, xmi;wj = 0 for i 6= j.
Hence in GSA-LP, when m2 proposes to w2 for the rst time, f(m2) is already
1, but f(m3) = 0 unless m3 proposes to w3. Therefore, w2 always chooses m2
and hence we can obtain Mopt.
4 Analysis of the Approximation Ratio
4.1 Overview of the Analysis
Let us x an instance I. Let Mopt be an optimal solution, namely one of the
maximum stable matchings of I, and M be the stable matching output by
GSA-LP. Let G = (U; V;E) be the bipartite graph obtained by superimposing
Mopt onM , that is, each vertex in U corresponds to each man, and each vertex























mq : wq ws
wp: mp ms
wq : (mp mq)
ws: mq
(b)
Fig. 1 Illustrations of (a) an augmenting three-path and (b) an augmenting ve-path. Solid
lines represent M -edges and dashed lines represent Mopt-edges.
in V corresponds to each woman. For simplicity, we do not distinguish between
a person and a corresponding vertex (e.g., a vertex of G corresponding to a
man m is also denoted m). If m 2 U and w 2 V are matched in M , then E
includes an edge (m;w), called an M -edge. Similarly, if m and w are matched
inMopt, then E includes anMopt-edge (m;w). Graph G contains parallel edges
(m;w) if (m;w) is a pair in both M and Mopt. Note that each vertex in G
has degree at most two, and hence each connected component of G is either
a single vertex, an alternating path, or an alternating cycle. In this paper, we
refer to a path of length three starting from and ending with Mopt-edges as an
augmenting three-path (see Fig. 1(a)). We can prove Proposition 1 by following
a similar analysis to Kiraly's GSA1 [15].
Proposition 1 There is no augmenting three-path in G.
Proof Suppose that there is such a path m0{w{m{w0, where (m;w) is a pair
in M and (m0; w) and (m;w0) are pairs in Mopt. (See Fig. 1(a).) Since the
men's lists do not include ties, w is better than w0 in m's list (otherwise,
(m;w0) is a blocking pair in M). This implies m0 =w m since otherwise, there
exists a blocking pair either in M or in Mopt. Since w
0 is single in M , m never
proposed to w0, meaning f(m)  1 at the end (and hence at any moment) of
the algorithm. Since m0 is single in M , m0 must send a proposal to w with
f(m0) = 3. But this is a contradiction since w selected m rather than m0. ut
Let S be the set of men and women who are single in M . Also, let us
partition M into P , Q, and R using the graph G: Consider a path of length
ve starting from and ending with Mopt-edges, which we will refer to as an
augmenting ve-path hereafter. (See Fig. 1(b). The preference structure shown
here will be established later by Lemma 5.) Let ms, wp, mp, wq, mq, and
ws be the men and the women on this path appearing in this order, that is,
both ms and ws are in S, and wp =Mopt(ms), mp =M(wp), wq =Mopt(mp),
mq =M(wq), and ws =Mopt(mq). Let P be the set of pairs (mp; wp) and Q be
the set of pairs (mq; wq) on all the augmenting ve-paths. Let R =M n(P [Q).
Note that G does not contain a path of length one (i.e., an isolated edge)
as a connected component, because if such a path (e.g., an Mopt-edge (m;w))
exists, then (m;w) is a blocking pair for M . Graph G does not contain any
augmenting three-path by Proposition 1. An augmenting ve-path contains
one edge from each of P and Q, and threeMopt-edges. Hence the total number
of Mopt-edges contained in augmenting ve-paths is exactly
3
2 (jP j+ jQj). For
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other connected components of G, the ratio of the number of Mopt-edges to
the number of M -edges is at most 43 (for augmenting seven-paths). We thus
have Lemma 1, which is one way of bounding jMoptj by jP j, jQj, and jRj.
Lemma 1 jMoptj  32 (jP j+ jQj) + 43 jRj.
Since jM j = jP j+jQj+jRj, Lemma 1 gives jMoptj  32 jM j  16 jRj. However this
guarantees only the ratio of 1.5 when jRj = 0, which is exactly the worst-case
example for Kiraly's GSA1 [15].
The advantage of our new algorithm is that it allows us to apply another
formula to bound jMoptj, in the following way: Recall that xi;j is the value of
xi;j for the optimal solution x
 of LP (I). Note that if xm;w > 0 for m;w 2 S,
then (m;w) 2 A by Constraint (4) of LP (I), so (m;w) is a blocking pair for




i;j = 0. Now, let us dene the value x
(X)




























i;j = 0. Hence the optimal value of the objective func-
tion of LP (I) can be written as (x(P ) + x(Q) + x(R))=2 and we have that
jMoptj  (x(P ) + x(Q) + x(R))=2. We will later prove the following key
lemma.
Lemma 2 x(P ) + x(Q) + x(R)  25 (7jP j+ 7jQj+ 9jRj).
Hence we have that jMoptj  15 (7jP j+7jQj+9jRj), that is, 5jMoptj  7(jP j+jQj)+9jRj. By Lemma 1, we have 12jMoptj  18(jP j+ jQj)+16jRj. By adding
these two inequalities, we have 17jMoptj  25(jP j+ jQj+ jRj) = 25jM j. Thus
we obtain the following theorem:
Theorem 1 The approximation ratio of GSA-LP is at most 25=17.
4.2 Proof of Lemma 2












Then we can show the following two lemmas, whose proofs will be given
later.
Lemma 3 x(P ) + x(Q) + x(R)  2jP j+ 2jQj+ 6jRj+ 4+ 4.
Lemma 4 x(P ) + x(Q) + x(R)  3jP j+ 3jQj+ 3jRj     .
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Using these two lemmas, we prove Lemma 2.
Proof By multiplying the inequality of Lemma 4 by four and then adding to
the inequality of Lemma 3, we obtain this lemma. ut
The rest of this section is devoted to the proofs of Lemmas 3 and 4. In
Sec. 4.3, we give some properties of P , Q, R, and the optimal LP solution. In
Sec. 4.4, we give upper bounds on x(P ), x(Q), and x(R). Finally we prove
Lemma 3 in Sec. 4.5 and Lemma 4 in Sec. 4.6.
4.3 Properties of P , Q, R, and LP Solution
We rst show several basic properties that will be used later. Lemma 6 is
especially important since it makes a dierence between our new algorithm
and Kiraly's.
Lemma 5 Consider an augmenting ve-path in graph G. Let ms, wp, mp,
wq, mq, and ws be the men and women on this path appearing in this order
(note that (mp; wp) 2 P and (mq; wq) 2 Q). Then the following (i) { (v) hold:
(i) wq mq ws, (ii) mp wp ms, (iii) wq mp wp, (iv) mp =wq mq, and
(v) f(mp)  1 and f(mq)  1 at the termination of GSA-LP.
Proof If ws mq wq, then (mq; ws) blocks M . Hence (i) holds (note that the
men's lists do not contain ties). Since ws is single in M , mq did not propose
to ws, and hence f(mq)  1 (the latter of (v)).
For the same reason as for (i), we have that mp wp ms. To show that (ii)
holds, we show that mp =wp ms does not hold. Suppose that this condition
holds. Since ms 2 S, ms must have proposed to wp with the value f(ms) = 3
in the nal round. Then, since wp is matched with mp in M , f(mp)  3 at
the termination. Hence mp must have completed the second round and hence
must have proposed to wq with the value f(mp)  2. As we have proved above,
f(mq)  1, but wq is eventually matched in M with mq, so mq wq mp. But
then by (i), (mq; wq) blocks Mopt, a contradiction. Hence (ii) holds.
Condition (iii) holds since if not, then (mp; wp) blocks Mopt, and condition
(iv) holds since if not, then either (mq; wq) blocks Mopt or (mp; wq) blocks M .
Suppose that f(mp) > 1. Then mp must have proposed to wp in the second
round and hence also to wq (recall that wq mp wp) with this f value. But
this contradicts the fact that mp =wq mq and wq selected mq whose f value
 1, which completes the proof of (v). ut
Next, we prove several equations: The rst ones areX
jmw;j2S
xm;j = 0 and
X
iwm;i2S
xi;w = 0 for (m;w) 2M: (6)
For the left equation, suppose that there is a woman j such that j 2 S and
j m w. Then woman j must include m in her list. Hence (m; j) blocks M ,
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which contradicts the stability of M . The right equation can also be validated
in a similar way. The next equation isX
i=wm;i2S
xi;w = 0 for (m;w) 2 P [Q: (7)
Suppose that there exists a man i such that i =w m and i 2 S. Then man
i must include w in his list. Since i 2 S, i should have proposed to w with
f(i) = 3. This contradicts the fact that w selected m whose f value is at most











Proof Consider an augmenting ve-path of Fig. 1(b). Note that both mp and
mq obtained their partners in the rst round (by Lemma 5(v)). Let f(mq)
be the nal f -value of mq, and f
0(mp) and f 0(mq) be the maximum f -values
of mp and mq respectively, when they proposed to wq (note that they may










for the reasons given shortly. Note that the lemma is proved if we add this
inequality for all augmenting ve-paths.
Now, here are reasons for the validity of the above inequalities. (i) The
rst equality is due to Equation (6). (ii) The rst inequality is the key fact
obtained from our new algorithm: When mp proposes to wp for the rst time,





. Since wq mp wp, mp must have
already proposed to wq with at least this value. (iii) The second inequality
is due to the fact that wq selected mq rather than mp as her partner (note
that mp =wq mq by Lemma 5(iv)). (iv) The third inequality is obvious since
the value of f(mp) is monotone non-decreasing. (v) The nal inequality is
because mq proposed neither to Mopt(mq) (since M(mq) = wq mq Mopt(mq)
by Lemma 5(i)), nor to any woman in S (because once a woman receives a
proposal, she is matched at the end). ut
4.4 Bounding x(P ), x(Q), and x(R)



































































 4jP j   pm   pw; (8)
and similarly we also have
x(Q)  4jQj   qm   qw (9)
and
x(R)  4jRj   rm   rw: (10)
To prove Lemmas 7 and 8, we use the following inequality, which is imme-






























Proof By the denition of x(P ) and Constraints (1) and (2) of LP (I),











































xm;j (by Inequality (11))
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ut
Lemma 8 x(R)  3jRj.





Next, partition R into R+ and R0 such that R+ = f(m;w) 2 R j sm;w > 0g
and R0 = f(m;w) 2 R j sm;w = 0g.
Now, consider (m;w) 2 R+. Since sm;w > 0, there exists a man i 2 S such
that i =w m. Since i is single in M , f(i) = 3 when i made the last proposal
to w, and hence f(m)  f(i) = 3 at the termination of the algorithm. Hence,
during the execution of GSA-LP, m must have proposed to all the women in
his list. Therefore, all of the women in his list are matched in M , and thus we


















Next, let us consider (m;w) 2 R0. By noting that men do not have ties,
































 3jR0j: (by Inequality (11))
Finally, by inequalities (a) and (b), we have x(R) = x(R+) + x(R0) 
3jR+j+ 3jR0j = 3jRj. ut
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4.5 Proof of Lemma 3























Note that pm =  +  =  +  and qm =  + . (Recall that  and  are
dened in Sec. 4.2.)
Then, we show the following useful lemma.
Lemma 9 jP j     +  + rm:
Proof It is easy to see that




















where the second equality is from Equation (6) and the inequality is from





















The lefthand side of the inequality is the sum over all xi;w such that
(a) (m;w) 2 P , (b) i w m, and (c) xi;w > 0. To prove the lemma, we
show that every such xi;w appears in the righthand side.
Let us consider a triple (m, i, w) that satises (a), (b), and (c). If i 2 S,
then xi;w = 0 by (a), (b), and Equations (6) and (7), which contradicts (c).
Hence, i 62 S and so (i;M(i)) 2 P [Q [R.
From (a), m w Mopt(w) by Lemma 5(ii). By using this and (b), we have
(d) i w m w Mopt(w). Since w includes i in the list, i includes w in the list,
and hence, Mopt(i) must exist and Mopt(i) i w, as otherwise, (i; w) blocks
Mopt by (d). It can be veried that such x

i;w appears in the righthand side,
that is, if (i;M(i)) is in P , Q, and R, respectively, then xi;w appears in the
rst, the second, and the third terms, respectively, of the righthand side. ut
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It is not hard to see that pm + qm + rm = pw + qw + rw and   pm by
denition and     qm by Lemma 6. Then, the following inequality is
immediate by Inequalities (8), (9), and (10).
x(P ) + x(Q) + x(R)
 4jP j+ 4jQj+ 4jRj   2(pm + qm + rm)
 4jP j+ 4jQj+ 4jRj   4   2rm (because   pm and   qm)
 4jQj+ 4jRj+ 4(+  + rm)  2rm (by Lemma 9)
= 2jP j+ 2jQj+ 4jRj+ 4+ 4 + 2rm (because jP j = jQj)
 2jP j+ 2jQj+ 6jRj+ 4+ 4: (because rm  jRj)
ut
4.6 Proof of Lemma 4
























where the equality is from mp =wq mq (Lemma 5(iv)) and the inequality is
from Constraint (3) of LP (I) (note that (mp; wq) 2 A). By summing up this
inequality for all of the augmenting ve-paths, we obtain this lemma. ut
By Lemma 5(iii), we have Mopt(m) m w for (m;w) 2 P . Therefore, by
using Equations (6) and (7), Lemma 10 can be written as:
Corollary 1 + qw  jQj.
Then the following inequality follows from Lemmas 7 and 8, and Inequality
(9).
x(P ) + x(Q) + x(R)
 3jP j+ 4jQj+ 3jRj      qm   qw
= 3jP j+ 4jQj+ 3jRj            qw (because qm =  + )
 3jP j+ 4jQj+ 3jRj            qw (because    by Lemma 6)
= 3jP j+ 4jQj+ 3jRj          qw (because  +  = + )
 3jP j+ 3jQj+ 3jRj     : (by Corollary 1)
ut
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5 Integrality Gaps
In this section, we consider the limitation of our method. In Sec. 5.1, we show
that the integrality gap between our IP formulation and LP relaxation is at
least 1 + 1e (> 1:3678). This does not immediately imply a lower bound of
GSA-LP, but may be considered as some barometer to show its limit. Also,
in Sec. 5.2, we use a similar approach to show that the integrality gap is at
least 1:5  o(1) if we use the same IP formulation for the general MAX SMTI
(i.e., ties on both sides). Therefore, generalizing Kiraly's GSA2 [15] (Kiraly's
5/3-approximation algorithm for the general MAX SMTI) or McDermid's algo-
rithm [18] using an optimal LP solution seems dicult unless a fundamentally
new idea is introduced.
5.1 One-Sided Ties
Consider the following instance I2 of MAX SMTI.





mk: w1    wk w2k wk: (m1    mk) m2k





m2k: wk w2k: mk
An optimal solution Mopt = f(mi; wi) j i = 1; : : : ; kg has size k, and hence
the optimal value of IP (I2) is k. However LP (I2) has the following solution
x.
 xmi;wj = 1k (1  1k )j 1 for (i; j) 2 f1; : : : ; kg  f1; : : : ; kg, xmi;wk+i = (1  1k )k for i = 1; : : : ; k, xmk+i;wi = 1  (1  1k )i 1 for i = 1; : : : ; k.













































This value approaches 1 + 1e (> 1:3678) as k goes to innity.
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5.2 Two-Sided Ties
We give an instance I3 with two-sided ties such that the integrality gap is
1:5  o(1) for IP (I3) and LP (I3).





mk: (w1    wk) w2k wk: (m1    mk) m2k





m2k: wk w2k: mk
An optimal solution Mopt = f(mi; wi) j i = 1; : : : ; kg has size k and hence
the optimal value of IP (I3) is k. However LP (I3) has this solution x:
 xmi;wj = 1=(2k   1) for (i; j) 2 f1; : : : ; kg  f1; : : : ; kg,
 xmi;wk+i = 1  k=(2k   1) for i = 1; : : : ; k,
 xmk+i;wi = 1  k=(2k   1) for i = 1; : : : ; k.


































In this paper, we presented a new upper bound of 25=17 on the approximation
ratio of MAX SMTI with one-sided ties, by extending Kiraly's and McDermid's
algorithms using IP and LP relaxation. An apparent future work is to further
improve this upper bound. One possibility is to improve Lemmas 3 and 4
because we believe that they are not tight. Another apparent future work is
to extend this method to the general MAX SMTI, which may require some
new ideas as mentioned in Sec. 5.
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